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UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A CONTRACT POLICING 
DEVICE FOR THE ELDER CLIENT: HOW USEFUL IS IT? 
Robyn L. Meadows* 
An elder law symposium provides an opportunity to consider ways 
that the various areas of the law provide protection for the older client.  
This raises the question of whether the Uniform Commercial Code 
(hereafter U.C.C. or the Code) protects the unique interests of the older 
consumer.  Such consideration naturally leads to the contract policing 
device specifically included in the Code—unconscionability.1 The 
doctrine of unconscionability provides a way for courts to police grossly 
unfair contracts and contract provisions.  It is found not only in the 
U.C.C. but also in the tenets of general contract law.2  However, its 
application is not limited to the elderly.  This piece will focus on the use 
of this contract policing mechanism to protect this one segment of the 
consumer population. 
Section 2-302 of the U.C.C., the unconscionability section most 
widely used and discussed, permits a court to refuse to enforce an entire 
contract, or specific provisions of the contract, if the court finds that the 
contract or provision is unconscionable.  It provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
 
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law.  J.D. University of Louisville, LL.M. 
Temple University.  The author wishes to thank the faculty and administration of the University of 
Akron School of Law and the members of the Akron Law Review for the invitation to participate in 
this symposium. 
 1. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (unconscionability provision for contracts for the sale of goods) and 
U.C.C. § 2A-108 (unconscionability provision for lease contracts). 
 2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
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When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial 
setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination.3 
Unconscionability, as provided for in the Code, arose from the 
common law.4 Initially, the concept of refusing to enforce perceived 
unfair bargains was limited to courts of equity.5 Courts of law were seen 
as being unable to refuse to enforce otherwise valid contracts because of 
an alleged unfairness.6 This led to courts of law searching for indirect 
ways to achieve the same result.  When presented with unfair contracts 
arising from perceived overreaching, some courts would refuse to 
enforce the offensive provisions through a variety of legal mechanisms, 
for example, by using the rules of contract construction, including the 
precept to construe a contract against the drafter, to prevent enforcement 
of an objectionable term, or by finding a particular provision against 
“public policy.”7 These types of machinations created inconsistent and 
unpredictable results.8 
Against this backdrop, drafters of the U.C.C. decided to include a 
provision permitting courts to rule directly on the unconscionability of a 
contract or a provision of a contract.9 The drafters believed that 
permitting direct inquiry into the unconscionability of a contract would 
result in more consistent decisions.10  Section 2-302 was included in the 
very first version of Article 2 and enacted as part of the Code in the late 
1950s and early 1960s by all except two states.11  Section 2-302 has 
 
 3. U.C.C. § 2-302. 
 4. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionability Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M.L. REV. 359, 361 (2001). 
 5. See Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability 
Has Become a Relic, 105 COMM. L.J. 287, 289-90 (2000) (discussing the early use of equitable 
powers of court to regulate “unconscientious” contracts). 
 6. See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and 
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 468 (1999) (discussing the powers of the equity courts to police 
unfair problems, but the inability of courts of law to similarly do so). 
 7. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.  See also Swanson, supra note 4,  at 362. 
 8. Brown, supra note 5, at 290. 
 9. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. (explaining section intended to permit courts to explicitly determine 
unconscionability of a contract or its provisions). 
 10. See Brown, supra note 5, at 288 and Donald R. Price, The Conscience of Judge and Jury: 
Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743, 744 (1981). 
 11. See Brown supra note 5, at 290 (discussing drafting history of unconscionability section 
in Article 2 of U.C.C.).  California and North Carolina did not initially enact the unconscionability 
provision of Article 2 but both have since done so.  See Prince, supra note 6, at 464, 490-91 (noting 
California and North Carolina were only two states that did not adopt section 2-302 when enacting 
2
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since been the basis for extending the doctrine of unconscionability into 
the law of leases in section 2A-108 of the U.C.C.,12 the common law as 
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208,13 
consumer protection statutes,14 and even the laws of other countries15 
and international law through U.N. Guidelines.16 
This Code provision permits a court to police an “unconscionable 
contract or provision,” but what is unconscionability?  Section 2-302 
does not define unconscionability, nor do most statutes or cases which 
address the issue.  It seems a court is supposed to “know it when the 
court sees it.”  The comments to 2-302 provide a test for determining 
unconscionability, which is “whether, in light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the 
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”17  
Essentially, this test says a provision is unconscionable if it is 
unconscionable and provides little guidance to the court. 
Being left on their own to determine the meaning of 
unconscionability, courts have defined unconscionability as “an absence 
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with 
contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”18  An 
unconscionable contract clause is one where there is “the absence of 
meaningful choice for the contracting parties, coupled with draconian 
 
the U.C.C. and discussing the history of section 2-302 in California). 
 12. U.C.C. § 2A-108. 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
 14. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (prohibiting supplier from committing an 
unconscionable act or practice in a consumer transaction) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:8-2 (West 2004) 
(making the use of unconscionable commercial practice in the sale of goods or real estate an 
unlawful practice). 
 15. See Bridgewater v. Leahy, 194 C.L.R. 457, 1998 WL 1672011 (High Ct. Australia 1998) 
(setting aside certain land transfers and options given by an elderly uncle to his nephew on the basis 
of unconscionability). 
 16. U.N. Expanded Guidelines for Consumer Protection, G.A. Res. 54/449, U.N. GAOR, 54th 
Sess., at 21 (1999) (providing governments should, through their internal laws, protect consumers 
from contractual abuse from, among other improper methods, unconscionable and unfair sales 
contracts and credit provisions).  See generally Brooke Overby, Contract, in the Age of Sustainable 
Consumption, 27 J. CORP. L. 603 (2002) (comparing consumer protection under the U.N. Consumer 
Protection Guidelines with American contract fairness doctrines, including unconscionability). 
 17. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (stating that judges have the discretion to strike unconscionable 
contracts). 
 18. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also 
Telecom Intern. America, Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 194 (2d Cir. 2001); Ingle v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679 
(N.M. 1985). 
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contract terms unreasonably favorable to one party.”19 
Unconscionability is not intended to erase the doctrine of freedom 
of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the law that the 
agreement has resulted from real bargaining between parties who had 
freedom of choice and understanding, and the ability to negotiate in a 
meaningful fashion.20 
Along that line, courts and commentators generally agree that, 
under Article 2 of the Code, a finding of unconscionability requires both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability.21  That is, the contract 
must result from a unconscionable process, and the contract or the 
relevant provision of the contract itself must also be unconscionable – an 
unfair provision resulting from an unfair process.22  Article 2A, 
governing the lease of goods, provides much broader protection in a 
consumer lease – it permits a court to refuse to enforce a provision or 
provide another appropriate remedy if the lease resulted from 
unconscionable conduct.23  This broader protection is also found in some 
consumer protection statutes.24 The absence of such broad protection is 
one of the limitations of unconscionability under Article 2 and the 
common law. 
Generally, unconscionability is defined by reference to relevant 
 
 19. Pyle v. Wells Fargo Financial, 2004 WL 2065652 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. 2004), citing 
Colins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
 20. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (stating “[t]he principle is one of the prevention of oppression 
and unfair surprise (case citation omitted) and not of disturbance of risks because of superior 
bargaining power”); Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(denying borrowers’ claim of unconscionability noting that inequality of bargaining power alone is 
a sufficient basis to invalidate an otherwise valid arbitration provision). 
 21. See Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183. F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
courts generally require both procedural and substantive unconscionability before upholding a claim 
of unconscionability); Anderson v. Delta Funding Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 554 (N.D. Ohio 2004) 
(finding procedural unconscionability alone is not enough to invalidate a clause on the basis of 
unconscionability); Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 
2002) (holding elderly, single female borrowers had sufficiently alleged dual requirements of 
procedural and substantive unconscionability in their challenge to defendant’s lending practices); 
and Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485 (1967) (discussing the requirement of procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
 22. See, e.g., Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1312 
(3d Cir. 1994) and Ferguson v. Lakeland Mutual Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
 23. U.C.C. § 2A-108 provides, in subsection (2): 
 With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds that a lease 
contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or 
that the unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a 
lease contract, the court may grant appropriate relief. 
 Id. 
 24. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (West 2004) (prohibiting unconscionable practices 
occurring before, during or after a consumer transaction). 
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factors to be considered in making the determination.25  One-sidedness 
of a provision is one factor to which the Code comments refer.26 Along 
this line, some courts have looked at the mutuality of the provision – for 
instance, whether a limitation of remedy applies equally to both 
parties.27  The comments also indicate that the doctrine of 
unconscionability is meant to prevent oppression and unfair surprise, 
suggesting that the effect a provision will have on one party, and the 
likelihood that party was aware of the provision, are important 
considerations.28 
In determining when a provision is unconscionable, courts look at a 
number of factors, including the relative bargaining power of the parties, 
the conspicuousness of the placement of the disputed term, and the 
oppressiveness and unreasonableness of the term.29 However, mere 
unequal bargaining power is not enough.30  There must be some 
evidence that this power was asserted, resulting in overreaching, such as 
by insisting on an unconscionable provision.31 The inequality of 
bargaining power must be so substantial as to render one party’s choice 
in the matter non-existent.32 
Factors for determining unconscionability in the bargaining process 
in the Restatement of Contracts include belief by the stronger party that 
there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party will fully 
 
 25. See Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting courts look at a 
number of factors in determining unconscionability, including the relative bargaining power of the 
parties, the conspicuousness of the placement of the disputed term, and its harshness and 
unreasonableness) and Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 892-93 
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (explaining factors relevant to determination of unconscionability, including 
among others, commercial reasonableness of contract terms, available alternatives to acquire the 
goods, and the parties’ relative bargaining positions, age, education, and business experience). 
 26. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 27. See Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998) (finding 
arbitration provision which preserved the lender’s right to litigate issues while requiring borrowers 
to submit all claims to arbitration was so one-sided as to be unconscionable). 
 28. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 29. See Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 30. Sander v. Alexander Richardson Investments, 334 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2003); Troy Mining 
Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E. 2d 749, 753 (W. Va. 1986) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (Second) 
OF CONTRACTS explanation that inequality of bargaining power, even if it results in inequality in 
allocation of risks, is not sufficient to find unconscionability); ABM Farms v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d 
574, 578 (Ohio 1998) (noting even an unsophisticated consumer may be bound to an arbitration 
provision because unequal bargaining power is not enough to find provision unconscionable). 
 31. Id. (stating: “A finding that the transaction was flawed, however, still depends on the 
existence of unfair terms in the contract. A litigant who complains that he was forced into a fair 
agreement will find no relief on grounds of unconscionability.”).  See also Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley 
Co. v. W. Harvey Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W.Va. 1977) (describing an unconscionable contract 
as one between “the rabbits and foxes”). 
 32. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1985). 
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perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker 
party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract; and 
knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable 
reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental 
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language 
of the agreement, or similar factors.33 
Consumer protection statutes, such as the Ohio consumer protection 
statute,34 generally list factors, similar to those considered by the courts 
under the U.C.C. or common law, to be weighed in making a 
determination of unconscionability under the statute.  The factors in the 
Ohio statute include: 
(1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the 
inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because of 
his physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to 
understand the language of an agreement; 
(2) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction 
was entered into that the price was substantially in excess of the price 
at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar 
consumer transactions by like consumers; 
(3) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction 
was entered into of the inability of the consumer to receive a 
substantial benefit from the subject of the consumer transaction; 
(4) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction 
was entered into that there was no reasonable probability of payment 
of the obligation in full by the consumer; 
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a 
consumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were substantially 
one-sided in favor of the supplier; 
(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of 
opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to his detriment; 
(7) Whether the supplier has, without justification, refused to make a 
refund in cash or by check for a returned item that was purchased with 
cash or by check, unless the supplier had conspicuously posted in the 
establishment at the time of the sale a sign stating the supplier’s refund 
 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
 34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (West 2004). 
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policy.35 
For the elderly, there are several of these factors that may be 
relevant.  Obviously, the fact that most inquiries into unconscionability 
determine the identity of the weaker party by reference to her situation, 
including any physical and mental conditions, may be relevant when 
considering unconscionability in a transaction involving an elderly 
consumer.  However, other factors that may come into play in such a 
situation include whether the other party knew at the time of the contract 
that there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in 
full by the consumer or knew of the inability of the consumer to receive 
a substantial benefit from the subject of the consumer transaction.36 
A number of cases involving mortgage refinancing and dance 
studios illustrate how courts use these factors.  In the 1990s, consumers 
reported mortgage financing schemes that charged excessively high rates 
and costs to elderly borrowers who, because of fixed incomes, were 
unlikely to qualify for conventional refinancing or home equity loans 
and were therefore particularly susceptible to unscrupulous lenders.37  
One suggestion for attacking the validity of these contracts is based on 
the lender’s knowledge that the elderly borrower on a fixed income is 
unlikely to be able to meet the payments associated with these loans.38 
There were a number of unconscionability cases involving elderly 
women and dance studios, which frequently involved dance lessons for 
life at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars, in the 1970s and 1980s.  In 
finding these contracts unconscionable, some courts considered the fact 
that the dance studio knew that it was unlikely that the elderly customer 
would ever reap the full benefit of the contract given the customer’s age 
and physical condition.39 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App. 1980) (upholding jury determination of 
unconscionable conduct in pressuring elderly widow to purchase expensive dance lessons).  See 
also Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986) (upholding trial court’s determination of 
unconscionability in sale of apartment building to experienced real estate purchaser when current 
payments were insufficient to cover accrued interest on unpaid sale balance and elderly grantor 
would have been 103 when the balloon payment became due). 
 37. See Kathleen E. Keest, House Rich Elderly, NAT. BAR ASSOC. MAG. 14 (Jan./Feb. 1994) 
(describing “equity-skimming” home improvement and mortgage scams perpetrated against elderly 
homeowners, viewed as house-rich but cash-poor) and Overby, supra note 16, at 616 (noting elderly 
have increasingly become targets of fraud, predatory and abusive lending and financial abuse). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App. 1980) (determining there was 
evidence to support jury’s finding of unconscionable conduct where dance instructors’ excessive 
pressure on a lonely, elderly widow to purchase excessively expensive dance lessons resulted in the 
dance studio taking advantage of the customer’s vulnerability). 
7
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A challenge to the enforceability of a provision on the grounds of 
unconscionability has been attempted in numerous cases involving 
elderly clients who were allegedly the victims of high-pressure sales 
tactics and overreaching.  Two cases have found provisions in these 
situations unconscionable. In Matthews v. New Century Mortgage 
Corp.,40 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held 
that elderly, unmarried female borrowers’ allegations that they were 
targeted for unfair loans based on their age, gender and marital status 
sufficiently stated claims that the loan contracts were unconscionable.41  
The borrowers, all single, elderly females, were pressured into home 
improvement loans by representatives of related home improvement and 
mortgage companies.  The transactions generally followed the pattern of 
the contract involving Ruth Morgan, an 87-year-old single woman.42  An 
employee of a home improvement company contacted Ms. Morgan and 
advised her the siding on her home was dirty and not “up to code.”43  He 
had her sign a contract for new siding at a cost of $17,325, after another 
employee assured her she could finance the siding.44  Ms. Morgan was 
not provided copies of the loan documents before closing on the loan 
nor, allegedly, at the closing.45  She was not informed of her three-day 
right to cancel.46  Although the terms were not explained to her, she felt 
obliged to sign the papers because the siding had already been removed 
from her house.47  It was only later that she learned that the home loan 
was not in an amount to cover the home improvements (plus a small sum 
to buy a used car), but refinanced her entire home mortgage for 
$49,000.48  She also learned that the loan application misstated her 
income and her employment.49  The monthly payment was initially set at 
$459.97, but shortly after she began making payments, she was advised 
her payment would go up.50  A number of months later, two of her 
 
 40. 185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 41. Id. at 892-93. 
 42. Id. at 877. 
 43. Id. at 877. 
 44. Id. at 877. 
 45. Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 46. Id. at 877. 
 47. Id. at 877-78. 
 48. Id. at 878. 
 49. Id. at 878-79.  The application indicated the 87-year-old Ms. Morgan was employed as a 
“quilt-maker” with American Quilt and had a monthly income of $1,500.  Id. at 879.  A business 
card “supporting” her employment was included in the mortgage file.  Id.  Ms. Morgan did not 
work, had never been employed in the quilting industry, and had a monthly income of only $713 
from social security benefits.  Id. 
 50. Matthews, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 878. 
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payments of $457.97 were returned as insufficient and shortly thereafter 
the mortgage company’s trustee filed a complaint to foreclose on her 
home.51 
Morgan and other plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of the Fair 
Housing Act,52 Equal Credit Opportunity Act,53 Truth-in-Lending Act,54 
Ohio’s fair housing statute,55 the Ohio Pattern of Corrupt Activities 
Act,56 and claiming civil conspiracy and unconscionability.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss all claims.57  On the unconscionability 
claim, the court denied the motion.58  The court found the plaintiffs’ 
factual allegations, such as those discussed above, were sufficient to 
support a claim that the terms of the contracts were so one-sided as to be 
substantively unconscionable.59  Additionally, the allegations supported 
a claim of procedural unconscionability because the mortgage 
representatives had significantly greater bargaining power, experience 
and business acumen than the elderly, unsophisticated borrowers.60 
In another case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
refused to enforce an arbitration provision in a consumer loan contract 
because the provision was unconscionable.61  The arbitration provision 
required the borrowers to submit all claims to arbitration, but preserved 
for the lender the right to litigate most issues in court.62 The court 
considered unconscionability under the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
as enacted in West Virginia.63  The court noted the borrowers were 
unsophisticated, elderly consumers,64 while the lender was a national 
corporate lender.  Therefore, the court found that their relative 
bargaining strengths were “grossly unequal.”65  Also important was 
evidence that the plaintiffs did not seek a loan, but were instead solicited 
by the lender, and the lack of evidence of any other alternative presented 
 
 51. Id. at 878. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-05. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1691. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. §§  1601 et. seq. 
 55. OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02(H) (West 2004). 
 56. OHIO REV. CODE § 2923(E) (West 2004). 
 57. Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 893 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 892-93. 
 60. Id. at 893. 
 61. Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E. 2d 854 (W.Va. 1998). 
 62. Id. at 860. 
 63. W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-121 et. seq. (1996). 
 64. The court noted the plaintiffs were a married couple in their sixties with limited education, 
the husband having completed the fifth grade and the wife the eighth grade.  Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at 
861 n.7. 
 65. Id. at 861. 
9
Meadows: Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
MEADOWS1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:58:33 AM 
750 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:741 
to the borrowers.66 
The court also found that the provision was “unreasonably 
favorable” to the lender because the borrowers were limited to binding 
arbitration regardless of the basis of their claim, but the lender retained 
its right to litigate virtually any claim it might have against the 
borrowers.67 This deprivation of the borrowers’ access to the courts 
while preserving the lender’s “is inherently inequitable and 
unconscionable.”68Finding both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, the court refused to require the borrowers to submit to 
arbitration.69 
Other cases have rejected unconscionability challenges to contract 
provisions under similar situations however.  In Harris v. Green Tree 
Financial Corp.,70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found 
an arbitration provision in a home improvement contract enforceable 
against the homeowners’ challenges that the provision lacked mutuality 
and was unconscionable.71  The plaintiffs sued Green Tree Financial 
Corporation, Green Tree Discount Company (Green Tree Financial’s 
subsidiary), and several affiliated building contractors, alleging fraud, 
jointly perpetrated by the defendants, in selling and financing home 
improvements.72  Allegedly, Green Tree recruited building contractors to 
sell home improvements to homeowners to be financed by high interest, 
secondary mortgage contracts, which were in turn sold to either Green 
Tree Financial or Green Tree Discount.73  The contractors were to target 
“relatively unsophisticated, low- to middle-income senior citizens.”74  
The plaintiffs claimed that, to close the deals, Green Tree instructed the 
contractors to use high-pressure sales tactics, such as in-home sales and 
telemarketing, and to assure the customer that the cost of the 
improvements would be reasonable and that no payments had to be 
made until the customer was completely satisfied.75  The plaintiffs also 
alleged that these standard contracts, provided by Green Tree for the 
contractor’s use, had misleading and fraudulent provisions.76 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 861-62. 
 69. Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E. 2d 854, 861 (W.Va. 1998). 
 70. 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 174. 
 73. Id. at 176. 
 74. Id. at 176. 
 75. Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 76. Id.  One such provision was a provision charging high premiums for collateral protection 
insurance. Id. at 176.  Another contested provision, the one at issue in this case, was an arbitration 
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The plaintiffs entered into a contract with one of the contractors and 
signed loan documents, including a secondary mortgage on their home 
that was promptly assigned to one of the Green Tree companies.77  The 
plaintiffs contended that some of the work was not completed as 
promised and other work was unsatisfactory.  Despite repeated 
complaints to Green Tree, nothing was done.78 
Despite not receiving the agreed-upon work, the plaintiffs were 
forced to continue paying Green Tree Financial on the loan to avoid 
losing their home in foreclosure.79  The plaintiff sued Green Tree and the 
alleged associates in the scheme, alleging violations of RICO,80 the 
Pennsylvania consumer protection statute,81 and numerous common-law 
causes of action including breach of contract and fraudulent and 
negligent misrepresentation.82  Green Tree moved to compel arbitration 
based on an arbitration provision in the contract that required the 
borrowers to arbitrate all claims but permitted Green Tree to seek 
judicial relief to enforce either the debt or the mortgage and to 
foreclose.83  The borrowers challenged the provision on the grounds that 
it lacked mutuality and was unconscionable.84 
The borrowers prevailed in the district court and the lenders 
appealed.85  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
rejected both the borrower’s arguments, reversing the decision of the 
district court and remanding with directions to compel arbitration.86  On 
the mutuality argument, the court noted that mutuality does not require 
equivalency of obligation, that is, that both parties are bound to arbitrate 
to the exact same extent.87  As long as there is consideration for the 
 
provision which required the homeowners to arbitrate all disputes but permitted the lender to use 
judicial proceedings to enforce the loan or the mortgage.  Id. at 177-78.  Because collection of the 
debt and enforcement of the mortgage would be the only actions commenced by the lender, 
essentially the homeowners waived their right to a jury trial and were compelled to arbitrate all 
disputes, while the lender waived none of its comparable rights.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 176-77. 
 78. Id. at 177. 
 79. Id. at 177. 
 80. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et. seq. 
 81. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 
201-1 et. seq (West  2004). 
 82. Harris, 183 F.3d at 177. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. The district court found the arbitration provision to be an unconscionable one-sided 
arrangement.  Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 1997 WL 805254 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 86. 183 F.3d at 184. 
 87. Id. at 180. 
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promise to arbitrate, the provision is enforceable.88 
The borrowers also used lack of reciprocal obligations to arbitrate 
as one of the grounds for their unconscionability claim.  The court also 
rejected this argument, finding that permitting Green Tree to litigate 
some claims while the borrowers had to arbitrate all claims was not 
unreasonably favorable to Green Tree, and thus not substantively 
unconscionable.89  The court also found the circumstances under which 
the contract was entered into and the arbitration provision was presented 
were not procedurally unconscionable.  The district court had found that 
the arbitration clause was in very small print on the reverse side of the 
contract.90 Although noting that some cases have considered the 
placement and conspicuousness of a provision in determining whether 
the provision is unconscionable, the court found that there was little 
support in federal case law for finding that this type of arbitration 
provision, presented in this manner, was procedurally unconscionable.91  
Finding neither procedural nor substantive unconscionability, the court 
upheld the provision. 
Several other courts have enforced arbitration provisions against 
claims similar to those asserted in Harris.  In Napier v. Manning,92 the 
Alabama Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an arbitration provision 
in a mobile home sales contract raised by two elderly borrowers with 
little formal education.  The court found that there was no evidence that 
the arbitration provided for in the contract was oppressive or unfair, or 
that the buyers had requested and been denied assistance in reading and 
understanding the provision, or that the buyers could not obtain the 
mobile home without signing the arbitration provision.  Further, the 
court found the other factors the buyers asserted—that they were elderly, 
had not finished high school and had difficulty reading—insufficient to 
invalidate the provision.93 
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
upheld an arbitration provision in a mortgage transaction against the 
borrower’s claims of unconscionability in Anderson v. Delta Funding 
Corp.94  The borrower alleged the parties’ relative bargaining strength 
was grossly unequal because she was an elderly, unsophisticated 
 
 88. Id. The court also noted that the weight of authority supported this approach. Id. 
 89. Id. at 183-84. 
 90. Id. at 182. 
 91. Harris, 183 F.3d at 182. 
 92. 723 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1998). 
 93. Id. 
 94. 316 F. Supp. 2d 554 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
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consumer who did not understand the language of the arbitration 
agreement the experienced lender supplied in the transaction.95  The 
court rejected this argument, reasoning that unequal bargaining power 
alone is not enough and the Arbitration Agreement was contained in a 
separate document, initialed on each page by the borrower and signed at 
the end.96 Additionally, the court noted that the lender had sent the 
Arbitration Agreement to the borrower four days before closing, giving 
her ample time to consult an attorney or otherwise familiarize herself 
with the provision.97 
The court also rejected an argument, similar to that raised in Harris, 
that the lender’s retention of the right to litigate collection and title 
actions deprived the arbitration agreement of mutuality and was 
therefore unconscionable.  The court found that Ohio courts do not 
require mutuality of an arbitration provision as long as the underlying 
contract is supported by consideration.98  Additionally, the court noted 
the only mutuality required of an arbitration provision is that both parties 
be bound by the arbitrator’s decision.99  Finding neither procedural nor 
substantive unconscionability, the court granted the lender’s motion to 
compel arbitration. 
In two cases involving nursing home contracts, courts rejected 
unconscionability claims raised by elderly residents.  In Owens v. Coosa 
Valley Health Care, Inc.,100 the Alabama Supreme Court rejected a 
request to find all arbitration provisions in contracts between elderly 
patients and nursing homes to be unconscionable.101  In this case, the 
daughter of the elderly patient reviewed and signed all admission papers 
on behalf of her mother.  The contract provided, in all capital letters, that 
all disputes relating to the provision of medical care between the parties 
would be subject to binding arbitration.102  When the patient later sued 
the home for failure to provide adequate care, the home moved to 
compel arbitration.  The trial court granted the motion.  Noting that the 
daughter, as guardian, signed the contract containing the clearly outlined 
arbitration provision, the Court found that the nursing home was under 
no duty to bypass the daughter and notify the patient directly of the 
 
 95. Id. at 564-65. 
 96. Id. at 565. 
 97. Id. at 565. 
 98. Id. at 566. 
 99. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 567 n.9 (citing Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 
856 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). 
 100. 890 So. 2d 983 (2004). 
 101. Id. at *5. 
 102. Id. at *1-2. 
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arbitration provision.103  Rejecting a per se rule and finding the plaintiff 
had failed to meet her burden to prove the arbitration provision was 
unconscionable, the court upheld the decision to compel arbitration.104 
In Guthmann v. La Vida Llena,105 the New Mexico Supreme Court 
held that a provision making the entry fee paid to a retirement/life-care 
facility non-refundable upon the death of the resident was not 
unconscionable.  A 79-year-old woman, with a life expectancy of 7-9 
years, paid an entry fee of $36,950 to LVL Nursing Care Center for a 
one-bedroom unit.106  In addition to the initial fee, the resident paid a 
monthly maintenance fee of $537.107  She was also required to have 
Medicare and at least one supplemental health policy to cover any 
medical services.108  The contract provided she could terminate the 
agreement with 90 days’ notice if she was able to live alone.109  Under 
those circumstances, she would be entitled to a refund of the entrance 
fee less ten percent plus one percent for each month of residence.110  
However, the fee was expressly non-refundable if the resident died after 
moving into the center.111  The resident took ill and died six months after 
moving into the residence.  The personal representative of her estate 
sued the retirement facility seeking a refund of the entry fee.112 
The court rejected the representative’s unconscionability claim, 
finding neither procedural nor substantive unconscionability.113  The 
plaintiff admitted the resident was not subject to any high pressure sales 
tactics, read all the terms of the agreement and understood the 
implications of the relevant terms.114  She had engaged in substantial 
comparative shopping, reviewed the provisions of the center’s contract 
with a representative of the center and a close personal friend and 
declined an attorney’s offer to review it for her.115  The court noted 
unconscionability is most successfully raised by consumers who are 
poor or disadvantaged and the resident in this case was neither.116  In 
 
 103. Id. at *4. 
 104. Id. at *5. 
 105. Guthmann v. La Vida Mmena, 709 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1985). 
 106. Id. at 677. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 677 (N.M. 1985). 
 111. Id. at 677. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 680-81. 
 114. Id. at 679. 
 115. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 677 (N.M. 1985). 
 116. Id. at 679-80. 
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contrast, the resident was financially well off even after payment of the 
entry fee and had an income more than sufficient to pay the monthly 
maintenance fee.117  All these factors warranted, in the court’s view, a 
finding that the contract was not a result of procedural 
unconscionability.118 
Additionally, the court found the provision was not substantively 
unconscionable.  The court set a very high standard for substantive 
unconscionability, noting the “terms must be such as ‘no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and . . . no 
honest and fair man would accept on the other’.”119  As expected after 
the enunciation of such a high standard, the court found that the 
provision was not grossly unfair or unconscionable because the resident 
could pay the fees, the fees were reasonable given the center’s financial 
needs, and the center provided what to the resident what she contracted 
for—residence in the facility for the remainder of her life, however long 
that should be.120  The court noted that nursing homes’ finances are 
based on the law of averages and each party takes a risk that the 
predicted life span of the resident will vary, the home that the resident 
will live longer than predicted and the resident that she will live a shorter 
period of time than anticipated.121  This reasoning provided a basis for 
the court’s rejection of the estate’s argument that the death of the 
resident after the contract was made rendered the contract 
unconscionable.  The court noted that unconscionability must be based 
on the circumstances existing at the time the contract was entered into, 
and not based on what happened after the fact.122  Finding neither 
procedural nor substantive unconscionability, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s entry of judgment in favor of the retirement center.123 
These cases demonstrate the difficulty with successfully 
challenging a contract or its provisions on the grounds of 
unconscionability.  Besides the requirement of proving both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability, most courts require a number of the 
 
 
 117. Id. at 678. 
 118. Id. at 680. 
 119. Id. (quoting In re Friedman, 407 N.Y.S.2d  999, 1008 (1978)).  This characterization can 
be traced back to the 18th century through Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) quoting 
Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)).  See 
Swanson, supra note 4, at 361. 
 120. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 680-83 (N.M. 1985). 
 121. Id. at 682-83. 
 122. Id. at 680. 
 123. Id.  
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relevant factors be established before a finding of unconscionability will 
be made.124  Additionally, and perhaps most important from a litigation 
standpoint, the issue of unconscionability of a contract provision, at least 
under the U.C.C. and the common law, is a question of law for the court 
and cannot be submitted to a jury.125  Finally, the party claiming 
unconscionability has the burden of proof on the issue.126 
Unconscionability does have advantages, however, over other 
traditional doctrines through which courts police contracts.  Courts have 
long policed contracts that are procured through fraud by permitting 
rescission of the contract or even awarding damages for losses suffered 
due to the fraudulent conduct.127  This is permissible even if a contract 
would otherwise fall under the U.C.C.  Section 1-103 provides that the 
principles of common law and equity, including fraud, supplement the 
provisions of the Code unless displaced.128  However, fraud generally 
requires a showing of a knowing misrepresentation of fact—not 
generally opinion—with the expectation that the other party would rely 
on the representation.129 
Additionally, in most jurisdictions, fraud must be plead with 
specificity and be proven by more than a preponderance of the evidence, 
 
 124. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 125. See U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (providing that the court makes the determination).  Official 
comment 3 to section 2-302 states: 
The present section is addressed to the court, and the decision is to be made by it.  The 
commercial evidence referred to in subsection (2) is for the court’s consideration, not the 
jury’s.  Only the agreement which results from the court’s action on these matters is to 
be submitted to the general triers of facts. 
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3. 
See also Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Co. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977) 
(holding that where provision is challenged as unconscionable, whether the provision is valid is a 
matter of law for the court.)  Actions for damages based on unconscionable conduct under consumer 
protection statutes, however, are generally tried before a jury.  See Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 
532 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1980) (upholding entry of judgment by trial court based on jury’s verdict 
finding unconscionable conduct). 
 126. See Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); Bishop v. 
Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc.,  
2004 WL 260969 at *5 (Ala. 2004); Napier v. Manning, 723 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1998). 
 127. See Frey v. Onstott, 210 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1948) (requiring, on the basis of fraud, 
reconveyance of property elderly grantor had conveyed to a friend with the understanding it would 
be reconveyed upon request even though the deed recited consideration); Domo v. Stouffer 580 
N.E.2d 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (explaining fraud can be the basis for equitable rescission or 
reformation of written agreement); Devlin v. Kearney Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 
204 (Ct. App. 1984) (upholding award of damages, including punitive damages, on basis of fraud 
and unconscionability). 
 128. U.C.C. § 1-103. 
 129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164. 
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typically clear and convincing evidence.130  A California case finding 
fraud against an elderly buyer arose from a sale of a car with a rolled-
back odometer – a clear violation of state and federal law and clear 
evidence of a misrepresentation – to an elderly couple.131  One 
advantage to a fraud claim, as demonstrated by the California case, is the 
availability of punitive damages, a remedy not possible if the claim is 
merely unconscionability under the Code.132  However, claims of fraud, 
though frequently raised, are rarely successful. 
Another common-law ground for avoiding a contract is duress.  
Historically, duress arose when one was physically compelled or 
physically threatened into entering a contract.133  Duress, however, is 
now broader and includes improper threats that deprive a person of any 
reasonable alternative but to assent to the terms sought by the person 
making the threat. 134  Difficult circumstances are not enough to 
establish either economic or physical duress as a basis to rescind a 
contract.135  Coercion requires improper threat by one of the parties to 
the contract that leaves the other with no reasonable alternative but to 
acquiesce.136  For duress, the will of the party must be overridden by 
force, threat of force or other improper threat.137  Needless to say, 
proving this level of threat is rarely possible in a contractual setting.  
Both fraud and duress vitiate a person’s consent to a contract – 
essentially, either requires a finding that the person would not have 
entered into the contract but for the fraud or duress.138 
 
 130. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. .P. 9(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 and cmts.; 
37 AM. JUR. 2D § 493 Fraud and Deceit § 493; Domo v. Stouffer, 580 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989) (holding clear and convincing evidence of fraud required to support equitable rescission or 
reformation of written agreement). 
 131. Devlin v. Kearney Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(upholding award of $80,000 in punitive damages based on fraudulent and unconscionable conduct 
of seller in taking advantage of 84-year-old buyer and his 66-year-old wife by selling them an 
automobile with a rolled back odometer). 
 132. U.C.C. § 1-106 (providing neither special nor punitive damages may be recovered under 
the U.C.C.). 
 133. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ED.) § 71:1 (noting early law required threats of loss 
of life, bodily harm, mayhem or imprisonment as grounds for duress). 
 134. Patton v. Wood Cty. Humane Society, 798 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).  See 
also Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57, 79-81 (2003) (discussing the shift in contract law from requiring 
physical threats as a basis for duress to including unlawful threats and economic coercion). 
 135. Blodgett v. Blodgett, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (Ohio 1990). 
 136. Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175. 
 137. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ED.) § 71:3 (noting duress is wrongful conduct that 
leaves the victim with no reasonable alternative but to agree to the other party’s demands). 
 138. See 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ED.) § 71:8 (discussing effect of duress on the 
enforceability of a contract). 
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Unconscionability does not require such a showing.  A person can 
“freely” enter into a contract, yet the contract be unconscionable.  
Additionally, the entire contract does not have to be unconscionable for 
a remedy to be available – a court can provide protection from an 
unconscionable provision in an otherwise valid contract.139  
Unconscionability is not susceptible to a higher level of proof beyond a 
preponderance of the evidence.140  Unconscionability in some consumer 
statutes and for consumer leases does not even require an unfair 
provision, just unfair conduct in the creation of the contract.141 
Unconscionability as a remedy for the elderly has its own 
limitations.  Under Article 2 and the common law, it requires a finding 
that both the challenged provision and the process through which it arose 
are unconscionable; that is, significantly unfair.  It is not designed to 
merely compensate for lack of bargaining power, even when it results in 
an unbalanced allocation of risks under the contract.  There are far more 
cases denying relief than providing relief for a claim of 
unconscionability.  Although not always successful, unconscionability 
does provide at least one tool to challenge the validity of a contract or 
contract terms imposed on elderly consumers. 
 
 139. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (both providing, 
upon a finding that a term in a contract is unconscionable, the court may enforce the contract 
without the unconscionable term). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/4
